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Abstract
Are macro-economists mistaken in ignoring bargaining between spouses? This paper argues
that models of intra-household allocation could be useful for understanding aggregate labor
supply trends in the US since the 1970s. A simple calculation suggests that with standard
preferences, the unitary model predicts a 19% decline in married-male labor supply in response
to the narrowing of the gender gap in wages since the 1970s. However married-men’s paid
labor remained stationary over the period from the mid 1970s to the recession of 2001. This
paper develops and calibrates to US time-use survey data a model of marital bargaining in
which time allocations are determined jointly with equilibrium marriage and divorce rates. The
results suggest that bargaining eﬀects raised married men’s labor supply by about 2.1 weekly
hours over the period, and reduced that of married women by 2.7 hours. While relative wage
growth can account for all of the increase in married women’s hours over the period, the decline
in marriage rates over the same period appears to be unrelated to wages; most of the marital
decline is due to forces outside the model, although the declining price of labor-saving home
equipment appears to play a signiﬁcant role.
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11 Introduction
The economic position of women appears to have improved signiﬁcantly relative to that of men
over the last forty years, as reﬂected in higher wages and stronger career prospects. Figure 1(a), for
instance, shows that the mean wages for workers with more than 10 average weekly hours converged
strongly over the period 1975-2001. As Becker (1988) has pointed out, this is a likely explanation
for the decline in marriage rates over the same period, as convergence in market wages reduces the
gains from marriage. Furthermore, to the extent that such changes improve the bargaining position
of women, they are likely to have shifted the allocations within marriage in favor of the wife.
Neither of these potential impacts of wage convergence have been extensively studied at the
aggregate level, largely because macro models of the household tend to ignore questions of intra-
household allocation.1 This paper asks whether extending a standard macro model to include
bargaining between spouses can enrich our understanding of the rise in married-women’s labor
supply observed in the US over the period 1975-2003. The implications for aggregate labor supply
and the decline of marriage are also examined. The analysis relies on a simple model of equilibrium
bargaining between spouses that is both tractable and compatible with the highly aggregated models
used in macroeconomics.
While the evidence for reallocations in response to improved outside options is quite strong
at the micro level, macroeconomic models with households usually abstract from such eﬀects by
assuming that the household acts as an economic agent with a stable utility function. At the
level of the micro data on labor supply, this "unitary" assumption has been shown repeatedly to
be inferior to an approach that allows allocations within the marriage to depend on the economic
position outside the marriage. For instance, Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) ﬁnd that the
data rejects the unitary model in favor of the "collective model with distribution factors", which is
essentially an empirical implementation of bargaining between spouses, in the tradition of McElroy
and Horney (1981). Empirical support for inter-temporal implications of this model was provided
by Mazzocco (2007). The comparative neglect of inter-spouse bargaining by macro-economists is
all the more surprising considering the central role of bargaining in the labor-search literature, and
the obvious parallels between employment and marriage relationships, as discussed in Burdett and
Coles (1999).
From the point of view of empirical analysis, an important advantage of employment relation-
ships is that wages and output are in principle observable, while the utility allocation between
spouses in a marriage is not. The standard practice in the collective-model literature has been to
study paid labor time as a proxy for intra-household allocations; the implicit assumption has been
that paid labor is negatively related to leisure, and that an improvement in the outside option of the
wife will result in an increase in her leisure, and hence a decline in her paid labor. A well-recognized
problem with this approach is that it is only valid if the relative prices faced by the married house-
hold , as well as its wealth, are invariant to the forces underlying the changes in the outside options.
Hence the collective-model literature is limited to the study of eﬀects that leave these unchanged,
such as local variations in divorce laws and in sex ratios of singles. Analysis of changes in relative
wages therefore requires a more structural approach which can account for income and substitution
eﬀects of wages.2
1For a recent exception, see Lise and Seitz (2011), who ﬁnd that accounting for trends in intra-household inequality
substantially reduces the apparent increase in consumption inequality over the last 30 years.
2Browning and Gortz (2006) ﬁnd that variation in wife’s leisure across Danish households is positively correlated
with her consumption expenditures, supporting the hypothesis of bargaining over that of preference heterogeneity.
This also rationalizes the use of leisure as a proxy for relative welfare in the household.
2The assumption that time outside of paid work equals leisure time is also unsuitable for historical
comparisons of leisure allocations, because it ignores the time married people spend in household
chores. Indeed Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) [GSY hereafter] have argued that rising
labor productivity at home accounts for roughly half of the increase in married-women’s labor supply
since 1945, as the time required to accomplish the chores has diminished, due to the decline in prices
of labor-saving home equipment. Over the 1975-2003 period, NIPA deﬂators show that in 2003 the
price of home equipment relative to consumption prices stood at about 25% of the 1975 level. Since
the main predictions of bargaining models for labor supply are based on the allocation of leisure,
this suggests that it may be misleading to make inferences from labor supply without accounting
for home-production time.
A sensible rationalization of the macro-economist’s neglect of intra-household bargaining might
be that the aggregate eﬀects of reallocation are likely to be small. Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan
(2003) have shown that a standard unitary household model with home production can explain the
rise in married women’s labor supply since 1950 in response to either the trend in the female-male
wage ratio or in response to rising productivity at home, as in GSY. In both cases, they ﬁnd that
calibration to US data implies that married men’s labor supply should have fallen, by somewhere
between 5-8 hours weekly. However Figure 1(c) shows that married men’s weekly paid work hours,
after a signiﬁcant decline in the 1960s, remained essentially stationary over the 1972-2001 period
while women’s relative wages were rising. This suggests that the shortcomings of the unitary model
may be signiﬁcant at the macro level. This of course has direct implications for aggregate labor
supply, which increased by roughly 20% over the same period.3
In this paper I show, using American surveys of household time use, that the problem of relative
leisure is robust to accounting for home production. While total working time of married people,
both men and women has increased since 1975, the ratio of husband’s non-working time to that
of the wife is roughly constant over the period. This is supported by similar ﬁndings by Bech-
Moen (2006) for the US and Norway. Slicing the data more ﬁnely to account for heterogeneity in
education, age or female labor force participation exacerbates the problem: the relative leisure of
wives actually increased in most of the sub-categories, declining only among couples over age 50.
Indeed, Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil (2007), noting that the leisure ratio is independent of relative
wages across a wide range of countries, despite disparities in relative wages, call this the "iso-leisure"
pattern, which they explain on the basis of social norms.
The argument developed here proceeds in two stages; ﬁrst a model of marriage and allocations
is developed; the model is equipped with a standard Cobb-Douglas home-production technology,
CRRA preferences, and a stochastic process for marriage quality. The marriage-equilibrium concept
is similar to that of Chade and Ventura (2005) but allows for intra-household bargaining as in
McElroy and Horney (1981). From the point of view of matching the iso-leisure fact, the key
feature of the model is that the bargaining position of the spouses depends on the marriage-matching
equilibrium, which is in turn a function of the relative wage. This feature is essential for reconciling
the standard macro model with the main empirical result, that the ratio of married women’s non-
working time to that of husbands was stationary over the period 1975-2003. Without bargaining, the
model predicts a 12% decline in this ratio, in response to the shrinking of the gender gap in wages.
Given a level of married leisure of roughly 61 weekly hours per capita in 1975, that translates into a
7 hour decrease in married-men’s working time. The model shows that the stationary leisure ratio
can be easily explained by the impact of relative wages on bargaining position, and hence without
reference to social norms. While the model is very stylized, this basic insight is clearly characteristic
3Prescott (2004) conjectures that the rise in per-capita hours was driven by tax reforms that ﬂattened the marginal
tax schedule. However the estimates of Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012) and Kaygusuz (2010) suggest that the
reforms of the 1980s had been largely eroded by the year 2000.
3of the broad class of models used in macro-economics; the most important assumption being that
household utility is within the CES class and separable across goods.
In the second stage, the paper proposes answers to the essentially quantitative questions raised
above: how much does intra-household bargaining change the model’s responses of labor supply
and marriage rates to relative wages, taxes, equipment prices or other shocks to the economic
environment? The model is ﬁrst calibrated to match time allocations for 1975 and 2003 so as to
permit an accounting-style decomposition of the changes over time. Values for wages, non-labor
income and tax rates are fed in from survey data. We allow preferences and technology to be speciﬁc
to each household type/year; the paper shows how the parameters are identiﬁed explicitly from the
moments of the data, so the model matches the time-allocation statistics and identiﬁes shifts in
technology and preferences. We then calibrate the marriage-matching process to observed marriage
and divorce rates, allowing the value of single life to shift over time so as to match the marriage
rates, but keeping constant the relative joy of single life.
This benchmark version of the model is then compared with the "unitary" version, in which
the Pareto weights on the spouses are held constant, to make it comparable to the standard macro
approach. Finally, the model is subjected to a series of computational experiments in which all
variables but one are kept at their 1975 levels; these experiments are carried out in both the unitary
and bargaining versions of the model.
With regards to explaining the rise in wife’s paid labor, the most important force is the closing
of the gender gap in wages, as in Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003). This is more than simply
a reallocation between husband and wife; the average labor supply of married couples increases by
more than 6 weekly hours. However bargaining turns out to have little eﬀect on per-capita hours,
justifying the neglect of bargaining in models at the highest level of aggregation. With rigid Pareto
weights, the error in the predicted per-capita hours is 0.8 hours, about 12% of the increase observed
since the 1970s.
In contrast to GSY, improvements in the home-production technology or the decline of home-
equipment prices seem to have little impact on female labor supply. This is because accounting for
the cost of husband’s time in home production reduces the measured equipment share in the home
production technology to the point that diminishing marginal returns preclude any major impact
of labor-saving equipment on time allocation. In the benchmark model, the declining equipment
price frees up 1.2 hours of the wife’s time from home production, but most of this is absorbed into
higher leisure. These two features, absent in GSY, plus the fact that the current paper is focused
on a later period in time, would appear to explain the divergence from their results.
Regarding the decline in the marriage rates of single women since the 1970s, the main message
from the calibration is that is has little to do with wages or bargaining. The main factor in the decline
appears to be the shift in preferences implied by the calibration of the time-allocation problem; this
makes singles better oﬀ relative to married, and single women better oﬀ relative to single men. Each
of these eﬀects are easily shown to reduce marriage rates, and together they explain about a third of
the observed decline. Home equipment prices play an important role too, accounting for 16% of the
marriage decline, as labor-saving equipment plays a more important role for single households than
married. This eﬀect is signiﬁcantly smaller than in Greenwood and Guner (2009), but the current
paper abstracts from an important feature of their model, the existence of ﬁxed costs of household
formation. Bargaining plays a relatively minor role, in accounting for marriage decline, magnifying
the impact of the preference changes by about 4%.
Relative to the large literature on female labor supply and intra-household allocation, the main
theoretical contributions of this paper are 1) to put the model into an equilibrium context, where
the outside options are determined endogenously, and 2) to develop a simple version of the model
that relates directly to the models used in macroeconomics. These features mean that allocations
4between married couples can be related thorough the model to data on marriage and on the time-
use decisions of single-person households; this disciplines the values of the outside options in the
calibration. A recent paper in which marriage and intra-household outcomes are modeled as jointly
determined is Choo, Seitz, and Siow (2008); they analyse female labor supply but, in the absence
of a bargaining model are limited to the consideration of distribution factors, like the sex ratio.
The model in the current paper can be seen as extending the two-period marriage-market models
of Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2000) and Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003), where the
analysis is limited by wage heterogeneity to one or two marriage opportunities per lifetime.
It is important to stress that the extreme simplicity of my approach precludes direct comparison
with life-cycle models of the trends in female labor supply. Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos
(2008) (ALS hereafter), for instance, use a lifecycle model to consider the role of returns to experience
and the costs of child-raising; they abstract however from intra-household allocation and marriage
decisions, taking the arrival of children and the marital status of women as exogenous in order to
focus on selection into the labor force. They ﬁnd that convergence in wages can account only for the
increased participation of non-mothers; a decline in child-care costs (relative to the female wage) is
more eﬀective in account for increased work of mothers. The current paper does not model children,
making child-care irrelevant, while ALS ﬁxes the timing and quantity of children, making child-care
essential for working mothers. Both approaches are abstractions; since working women can delay
fertility, the truth must lie somewhere in between. My model also abstracts from other important
features in ALS model, such as age and the intensive/extensive margin distinction; the results of
this paper suggest that it would be useful to extend the lifecycle approach to allow for marriage
decisions and bargaining between spouses.
2 Trends in Time Allocation
Standard macro data sets lack systematic information on unpaid work; this turns out to be critical
for distinguishing diﬀerent versions of the household model, which hinges on the response of total
work time, including unpaid work, to changes in relative prices. The goal of this section is to
document patterns in non-working time by studying these changes. The strategy is to use the
March CPS the standard source of macro labor-time data, to document the trends in paid labor
and relative wages and show that the trends are driven by the behavior of married people. Since
unpaid work time is not documented in the CPS, we then turn to time-use surveys and show that
the relative leisure ratio has been stationary over the 1975-2003 period,
2.1 Paid-Labor Supply Trends: CPS
Figure 1(c), which shows the labor-supply trend by sex and marital status, the trend in relative
wages, and the per-capita hours trend, is based on the March Supplement of the CPS, from 1962 to
2006. To ﬁlter out the role of cyclical ﬂuctuations, Table 1 averages the data over several years. The
population is restricted to civilians age 18 to 65, a standard deﬁnition of working-age adulthood.
Younger people are likely to be constrained by compulsory schooling, and older people by mandatory
retirement, social security rules, and disabilities. The weekly hours variable is the reported hours
worked last week.4
For married women it is clear that average weekly hours of paid labor increased steadily, from
an average of 11.8 in the 1962-66 period to 22.97 in 1994-2001. For single women, there is no
trend, hours ﬂuctuate between 22 and 26 over these periods. For single men, the pattern is similar,
4Similar results obtain if instead we multiply usual weekly hours by number of weeks worked.
5a stationary series that ﬂuctuates between 24 and 28 weekly hours. For married men, hours are
essentially constant at 36 from 1976-2003.
The wage trend shown in Figure 1(a) is computed by dividing annual earnings by annualized
hours worked, as given by the hours worked last week response. To avoid noise from people with
low hours, the sample for this calculation is restricted to people who worked at least 10 hours.
Average hours worked per person in 1971 was 24.7, slightly lower than in 1962. Figure 1(b)
shows that, over the next 28 years, average hours rose steadily to 29.3 in 2000, an increase of nearly
18% .
To compare the lifecycle and cohort eﬀects, Figure 2 shows age-hours proﬁles for 10-year birth
cohorts of married men and women. Those for women rise signiﬁcantly with each successive cohort;
by 3 hours at age 30 when we move from the 1930s to the 1940s cohorts, by an additional 7 hours
to the 1950s cohort, and by another 3 hours from the 1950s to the 1960s cohort. In contrast, the
age-hours proﬁles of married men are essentially identical over all cohorts. This also means that
there is no question here of substitution of labor time across the lifecycle in response to changes in
married women’s roles: the shape of the men’s proﬁles do not change systematically as we move
across cohorts.
It may be interesting to explore the possibility that the lack of trend in husband’s hours is driven
by conﬂicting trends between households where the wife works and those where she doesn’t, or by
a rise in household where the wife works. In the appendix, Figure A1 shows that for wives aged
less than 50 years, husband’s hours are stationary after 1974 for both household types. In all cases,
husbands work more in households where the wife is also working. For households where the wife
is older than 50, there is decline in husband’s hours until 1984 for households where the wife is not
working, and stationarity thereafter. The stationarity of husband’s paid working hours therefore
holds even when age and labor force status are accounted for, except that, for the oldest group, the
stationary period starts somewhat later.
Another possibility is that paid work hours are ﬁxed by custom at a rigid number, such as 40
hours per week. Figure A2(a) shows that indeed at all age groups, the median in the 1990s is 40,
and for men older than 25, the 25th percentile is also close to 40. However the model implies that
if this constraint is binding, the household can respond by adjusting home work hours, which are
presumably free from the institutional rigidities that operate in the work place.
2.2 Non-Working time: The Time-Use Surveys
To track trends in unpaid work and hence non-working time, we follow the existing literature in
relying on a collection of cross-sectional time-use surveys beginning in 1965 and culminating in
the ﬁrst wave of the American Time Use Survey in 2003. These appear to be the only source of
representative data on home production time apart from cooking and cleaning, notably child care
and shopping time, as well as unpaid work time and leisure activities. This is important because
it is well-known (see Gershuny and Robinson (1988) ) that married-couple’s allocation of home-
production time has shifted since the 1960s, with husbands apparently bearing a larger share of
house work than in the past.
Because of inconsistent design over the years, comparison of variables from the time-use surveys
requires standardization of activities into broader categories. Results for this type of exercise are
reported by Robinson and Godbey (1997) and Aguiar and Hurst (2007); from the regression methods
of the latter, for instance, we learn that, over the period 1965-2003, leisure for men increased by
roughly 6 to 9 hours per week (driven by a decline in market work hours) and for women by roughly
4 to 8 hours per week. Robinson and Godbey (1997) also ﬁnds that women’s total work declined
over the 1965-1985 period.
6For the purposes of the current paper, however, a closer look at the data is warranted for three
reasons. First, while the existing results concern the population as a whole, we need to examine the
time allocation of married people. Second, the results reported in previous papers concern trends
since 1965, with little information on the period that is critical for the analysis here, 1975 to the end
of the 1990s. The 1965 survey is not in fact representative, as the representative component consists
of a small (n=1200) sample that restricts attention to people living in cities of population 30,000
to 280,000. Finally, while the labor literature analyses trends in leisure, deﬁned as time in speciﬁed
non-work activities such as attending social functions or watching TV, in the macro literature it is
standard to divide discretionary time into paid work, home-production and non-working time.
Of the 168 hours available each week, it is assumed that the minimum time required for sleep and
personal care is 50 hours, which turns out to be the ﬁrst percentile in the pooled data for 1965, 1975,
1985 and 2003. The exact number assigned to this minimum time is without consequence for the
analysis. The important point is that time spent in sleep and personal care includes a discretionary
component, as documented by Biddle and Hamermesh (1990). This paper assumes discretionary
time is allocated between paid work and unpaid work; the residual is taken to be non-working time.
The variables making up each of these categories are taken from the deﬁnitions of Aguiar and Hurst
(2007).
Table 2(a) reports the time allocation of married people aged 18-65 according to these surveys.
The table shows that working time did decline over the longer period since 1965, but all of this
decline was before the period of interest begins in 1975. Since then the working time of both married
men and women has increased, due to a rise in unpaid work for men and in paid work for women.
The main point however is that while non-working time has declined slightly for both husbands
and wives since 1975, the ratio of married women’s non-working time to that of married men has
remained stable; 1.073 in 1975, 1.073 in 2003. Even after accounting for unpaid working time
therefore, married women’s non-working time is not responding relative wages in the way predicted
by the unitary model.
Part (b) of the table shows that unpaid working time is composed largely of time spent cooking
and cleaning in the case of the women; while this component has increased 50% for men, it was
still only 3.33 hours weekly on average in 2003, compared to 14.9 hours for wives. Commuting and
Job-related time declined for both men and women, even though time in paid work did not. The
2.5 hour decline for men in time spent in Job-related was largely oﬀset by small increases in other
categories. One category that increased for both men and women was child care (excluding time
spent playing with children); the eﬀect is small however relative to the other changes, so it does
not appear worth worrying how time spent in this category might be mis-measured. Overall, men
in 2003 were spending two more hours in "Other home production" per week, and one more in
"Cooking and Other Indoor Chores" than in 1975. The lack of trend in relative non-working time
therefore is robust to how we treat child-care time.
Table 3 shows that conditioning on observables such as age, education and labor force status
does not explain the stationarity of relative non-working time. The relative wages of the sub-samples
are shown in Table 3(a), which gives the female/male wage ratios for people working 10 hours more
per week. For the 25-54 age group, the ratio of mean wages rises from 0.6 in the 1967-74 period to
0.76 in the 1995-2000 period. For the 55-65 age group, the wage ratio is the same in both periods.
For those with less than a bachelor’s degree (BA), the ratio evolves from 0.6 to 0.76; for those with
a BA or more , the trend is weaker, from 0.66 to 0.72, falling back to 0.69 in the 2000-2006 period.
Table 3(b) shows that, over the 1975-2003 period, only one group of husbands gets an increase in
relative non-working time; those with educational attainment equal to 12 years, the equivalent to a
high-school diploma. The wife’s relative non-working time falls in this case from 1.14 to 1.06. For
all other groups, wife’s relative non-working time increases or stays constant. Most signiﬁcantly,
7when the sample is restricted to spouses who are working, the wife’s relative non-working time
increases from 0.97 to 1.04. The eﬀect appears to be strongest among younger couples; the increase
for married people aged 25-55 is from 0.94 to 1.04. Among the 55-70 age group the rise in wife’s
relative non-working time is much weaker, from 1.01 to 1.06, which may be due to the fact that
the wage change is much smaller for this group as shown in Table 3, from 0.66 to 0.69. Far from
accounting for the failure of husband’s non-working time to rise, the observables seem to exacerbate
the issue by revealing that in fact it is the wife’s relative non-working time that is increasing within
most groups.
Could it be that there is a rigidity, perhaps due to social norms, that restricts married couples
from freely adjusting non-working time? It is generally diﬃcult to examine this in the time-use
surveys because they sample individuals, rather than households. However in 1985, the sample
includes 531 married couples. Figure A2(b) shows the husband-wife ratios of nonworking time for
this sample. While it is clear that the distribution is centered around one, considerable dispersion
exists. A similar result for Australia, Germany and the US is obtained by Burda, Hamermesh, and
Weil (2007). While analyzing the source of this dispersion is outside the scope of the current paper,
it seems to indicate that there is no lack of ﬂexibility in the allocation of non-working time.
3 A Model of Marriage and Labor Supply
This section describes a simple equilibrium marriage model. We ﬁrst work out the eﬃcient alloca-
tions, taking as given the Pareto weight the household puts on each spouse. Holding these weights
ﬁxed corresponds to the standard unitary model used in macroeconomics. We then extend the
model by nesting a bargaining theory in which the Pareto weights depend on the value of leaving
the marriage. Finally, we work out how the equilibrium weights depend on full income by marital
status for all household types. A simple example of the model is then fully worked out to show how
the main features determine labor supply.
3.1 Household Structure
There is a large population comprised of two sexes i 2{ H,W} in equal numbers, who are otherwise
ex ante identical and live through an inﬁnite succession of discrete periods. At the beginning of
each period, people are either married or single. Married people learn their realization of a match-
quality shock ", choose allocations, and then choose whether to stay together or to divorce. If they
divorce, they must then wait until the next period to meet a new potential spouse. This shock has
an unconditional distribution  ; realizations are independent across pairings, but may be persistent
within. Let the conditional distribution be F ("0,"). The cost of divorce is dc   0.
All people who enter the period as singles are randomly paired with a single of the opposite
sex. The new pairs then learn their match quality ", choose allocations and decide whether to
marry. After the marriage decisions, all married couples choose their time allocations over market
and house work, and get utility from leisure, match quality and consumption of market goods.
Each agent i has a one-unit time endowment, which is allocated across three competing uses:
leisure li, work outside the household, ni and home work hi. There is a time cost tn per unit of
outside work. The time constraint for each agent i is:
li + ni (1 + tn)+hi =1
. Agents derive utility from leisure li, as well as the consumption of a market good c and a home
8good g. We assume a CES utility function:
u(c,l,g)=
 c
1    1
c1  1 +
 l
1    1
l1  1 +
 g
1    1
g1  1
. Preferences of individuals over inﬁnite streams of utility are represented by the discounted
sum:
E0
 
1 X
t=0
 j ⇥
u(ct,l t,g t)+JM
i,t "i,t
⇤
!
where m indicates marital status and JM
i,t is an indicator equal to one if the agent is in a married
household at the end of period t.
The home good is produced using inputs of housework time (hH,h W) from each spouse, as well
as a ﬂow of home equipment eq, according to a production function G(eq,h H,h W). In order to
allow both singles and married to be modeled as operating the same technology, we assume the
eﬀective labor input of married couples is CES in the individual inputs:
h(hW,hH)=
h
⌘0h
1 ⌘1
W +( 1  ⌘0)h
1 ⌘1
H
i1/(1 ⌘1)
Let the eﬀective time input be h and the goods input be eq. The home-production function is
G(h,eq)=z
h
e1 ✓
q
i
h✓
.
3.2 Markets, Prices and Taxation
Au n i to fo u t s i d el a b o rni by a worker of sex i produces wi units of a consumption good, which
is consumed within the period. Both the wage e wi and the work cost tn are parameters which
evolve exogenously. Households also have some endowed non-labor income, equal to ynl
M for married
couples and ynl
i ,i2{ H,W} for singles. Income is taxed according to a progressive tax schedule
that distinguishes between married and single households. The tax bill of a household of type i
with gross (taxable) income Yi is given by Ti (Yi). The household buys home equipment eq at price
pq per unit.
3.3 Eﬃcient Allocations
We show in the appendix how to write the decision rules as functions of the average and marginal
tax rates, which we denote TA,TM, respectively. Of course these expressions only give the optimal
decisions when evaluated at the correct tax rates, but this is easily resolved through iteration on
the tax rates, using the tax function T
 
Y T 
to update the tax rates, given the decision rules.
3.3.1 Singles
The indirect utility ﬂow of a single-person household with wage w is:
uS = maxc,l,g,h,e {u(c,l,G(h,eq))}
subject to
c + wl + T
 
Y T 
= w(1   h)+y   peeq
9where w is the wage, pethe price of equipment and y the non-labor income of the household. Taxable
income is:
Y T = w(1   l   h)+y
The reduced-form demand functions, which depend on the budget-constraint multiplier   are:
[c,l,g]=
⇣ c
 
⌘1/ 1
,
⇣  l
 wM
⌘1/ 1
,
⇣  g
 DM
⌘1/ 1
 
, where DM is the eﬀective marginal price of home goods, as derived in the Appendix, and wM =
w
 
1   TM 
is the eﬀective marginal wage for the single type. The full income of the household is
Y F = DA
⇣  g
 DM
⌘1/ 1
+
⇣ c
 
⌘1/ 1
+ wA
⇣  l
 wM
⌘1/ 1
, where DA is the unit cost of home production. The solution for the budget multiplier   is
given in the appendix.
We also ﬁnd that the equipment share of home-production costs is:
peeq
wAh + peeq
=
⌧ (1   ✓)
✓ + ⌧ (1   ✓)
, where ⌧ ⌘ 1 TM
1 TA represents the progressivity of taxes, and wA = w
 
1   TA 
is the eﬀective unit
cost of leisure. Of course the tax rates and hence the eﬀective wages will depend on the household
type through the taxable income, and hence the marginal and average prices of home goods will
too.
3.3.2 Married Households
The married household is assumed to maximize a welfare function consisting of a weighted sum
of the welfare of each spouse i 2{ H,W}, corresponding to the husband and wife. The state of a
marriage is given by the quality shock ".There is no commitment, so the decisions made by a new
marriage are the same as those of an existing marriage in the same state. Since allocations are
assumed to be eﬃcient, we can represent them as the solution to the household planner’s problem
where µi is the Pareto weight on spouse i in the planner’s objective function.
Since we assume utility is separable in the home good, and that spouses each get the same utility
from the home good, we can let the total utility ﬂow from the home good be v (G(H (hM,h W),e q)).
The couple chooses the husband’s allocation (cM,l M,h M) and the wife’s allocation (cF,l F,h F)
and home equipment eq to maximize
v (G(H (hM,h W),e q)) + µMuM (cM,l M)+µWuW
W (cW,l W)
subject to
cM + wMlM + cF + wWlW + T
 
Y T 
= wM (1   hM)+wW (1   hW)   peeq
and the time constraints for each spouse:
hM + lM  1
10where Y T represents taxable income:
Y T = wM (1   lM   hM)+wW (1   lW   hW)+y
. If we take as given the marginal wages wM
M,wM
W of the husband and wife, respectively, and let
  represent the budget-constraint multiplier, we can write the reduced-form demand functions as
[ci,l i,g]=
"
⇣µi c
 
⌘1/ 1
,
✓
µi l
 wM
i
◆1/ 1
,
⇣  g
 DM
⌘1/ 1
#
. The home-production inputs end being all proportional to the demand for home goods:
[hM,h W,e q]=

g
xg
,
xwg
xg
,
xeg
xg
 
, so the unit price of the home good is independent of the output level. The expressions for the
optimal values of the ratios xg ⌘ g/hM , xe = e/hM,a n dxw = hW/hM are given in the appendix.
Note the tight relationship of the wage ratio to the ratio of wife’s time to that of the husband, which
will be useful for choosing a value for ⌘1:
hW = xwhM =
✓
wM
wW
⌘0
1   ⌘0
◆1/⌘1
hM (1)
The equipment share of expenditure is given by:
pexe
wA
M + wA
Wxw + pexe
=
ˆ ⌧ (1   ✓)
✓ +ˆ ⌧ (1   ✓)
(2)
, where ˆ ⌧ , by analogy with the expression for singles, represents the eﬀective progressivity of
taxation of married couples (derived in the Appendix). These explicit solutions for all the decisions
rules will be very useful for providing a transparent identiﬁcation scheme in the calibration section.
3.3.3 Implications for relative leisure
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the spouses’ leisure imply that if the Pareto weights are constant, then
the ratio of marginal utilities for leisure will be proportional to the relative wage:
uM
l (cM,l M,g)
uW
l (cW,l W,g)
=
wM
wW
1   µ
µ
. In macro models, an assumption of separability between the leisure and consumption arguments
is required in order to explain the absence of long-run trends in hours worked per capita. This
implies that as the wage ratio wM
wW has fallen over time, the ratio of marginal utilities must have
fallen too, concavity of the utility function leisure implies that husband’s leisure should rise relative
to that of the wives. Using the CES speciﬁcation above, the prediction can be made quantitative.
The eﬃcient leisure ratio is given by:
lW
lH
=

wM
wW
µW
µM
 1/ 
.Blau and Kahn (1997) report that the average wages of women working full time rose, as a fraction
of men’s, from 0.60 to 0.76 over the period 1975 to 1995. If we follow Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-
Marcos (2008) in setting   =1 .5, the prediction is that married women’s leisure should have
11declined 12.4% relative of that of their husbands, an eﬀect on the order of 7 hours. Note that these
implications are independent of the tax function and the home-production technology. With joint
taxation, the relative wage of husband and wife is unaﬀected, so any increase in wife’s labor supply
induced by changes in the tax schedule should leave the leisure ratio unchanged.
3.4 Determination of the Pareto weights
Our theory of the Pareto weights is that they are functions of the gains from marriage, relative
to divorce, as in a wide range of papers from McElroy and Horney (1981) to Chiappori, Fortin,
and Lacroix (2002) to Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003). We will consider the Egalitarian
bargaining solution, because for special cases it renders the model tractable, so that we can solve
for equilibrium allocations and marriage decisions.5 In the case of a linear Pareto frontier, for
instance with fully transferable utility, a standard assumption in the labor-matching literature, the
Egalitarian solution is equivalent to the Nash bargaining solution with equal weights.
In what follows we consider a stationary environment; relative wages are constant, so the only
source of divorces is random variation in match quality; as spouses will agree on the states of the
world in which divorce is preferable, commitment is not an issue in this environment.6
Let UM
i
 
µi,YM 
+ " represents the indirect utility ﬂow to agent i from a marriage where µi
is the Pareto weight on agent i, and " is the current realization of a random variable representing
the quality of the marriage. Let V M
i indicate the value to a person of sex i of being married and
V S
i that of being single. Let   represent the unconditional CDF of "; this is the distribution from
which the match-quality realization is drawn for new matches. Let F ("0|") represent the conditional
distribution for on-going matches.
Standard arguments show that there exist thresholds "M," D such that marriage occurs only if
">" M and divorce only if "<" D.I f w e t a k e µ0
i as ﬁxed, the value to spouse i of being in the
marriage is
V M
i (µi,")=UM
i
 
µi,YM 
+ "...
...+ 
⇥
F
 
"D|"
  
V S
i   dc
 
+
 
1   F
 
"D|"
  
EV M
i
 
µ0
i," 0 ⇤
(3)
Similarly, for singles, let the indirect utility ﬂow be US
i , so that we can write the value of being
single as:
V S
i = US
i +  

 
 
"M 
V S
i +
ˆ
"M
V M
i
 
µ0
i," 0 
d (")
 
(4)
Deﬁne the gains from marriage, relative to divorce, as
WD
i (µi,")=V M
i (µi,")   V S
i   dc
where the divorce cost 2dc is assumed to be paid equally by each spouse.
Deﬁnition 1 Ab a r g a i n i n gs o l u t i o nB (WH,W W) is a mapping from a pair of functions WD
H (),WD
W ()
to a Pareto weight µ on spouse H. The weight on spouse W is given by 1-µ.
Notice that this deﬁnition allows B to map on to any Pareto-optimal allocation. The main
restriction relative to the set of all possible bargaining solutions, is that solutions depend only on
5The Egalitarian solution, while it lacks the scale invariance of the standard Nash solution, is more intuitive;
indeed Kalai (1977) argues that this solution implements a Rawlsian approach to justice.
6The computational methods we use can be extended to the case of wage trends with perfect foresight, provided
we assume full commitment at the time of marriage, but the solutions are diﬃcult to characterize analytically.
12the gains from marriage. This is quite standard in the literature on household labor supply, and
is consistent with the result of Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) and others who ﬁnd that
labor supply of married couples responds to variables ("distribution factors") that aﬀect the value
of single life, such as divorce rules, or the sex ratio of singles.
It is useful to contrast two common examples. The “Egalitarian” solution µE is deﬁned as the
value of µ that equalizes the gains from marriage. Hence µE solves:
WD
M
 
µE,"
 
WD
W (1   µE,")
=1
. A nice feature of this concept is that it is easy to solve because they symmetry implies terms that
are common to both sides drop out. The Nash solution by contrast takes into account both the
gains and the curvature of the Pareto frontier, i.e. the marginal cost of transferring utility. The
FOC for the Nash solution µN, with equal bargaining power, is
WD
M
 
µN,"
 
WD
W (1   µN,")
=  
@WD
M
 
µN,"
 
/@µ
@WD
W (1   µN,")/@µ
With concave utility, the right-hand side is declining in µN ; this reduces the elasticity of the
Nash solution with respect to gains from marriage. It turns out that while the Nash solution is
insuﬃciently elastic to fully account for the stability of relative leisure, the Egalitarian solution is
too elastic. In the quantitative analysis we will therefore rely on a convex combination of the two
solutions to generate Pareto-optimal allocations.
3.5 Matching Equilibrium
The marriage threshold "M sets the marriage surplus to zero, relative to single life. Similarly the
divorce threshold "D sets the marriage surplus to zero, relative to divorce. The wedge between the
two is a function of the divorce cost dc. These two thresholds deﬁne the market-clearing conditions
in a stationary marriage-market equilibrium.
Deﬁnition. A stationary recursive equilibrium of the matching market with progressive tax
functions Ti (·) and bargaining solution B (WH,W W), consists of a pair of thresholds
 
"M," D 
,a
Pareto weight µ, and for each household type i 2{ M,SW,S H}, allocations, tax rates
 
TM
i ,TA
i
 
and value functions
 
V M
i (µi,"),VS
i
 
such that:
1. The value functions solve the Bellman equations (3,4) for men and women, given the prices
{w,y,pq} and thresholds
2. The threshold "M sets to zero the gains from marriage, relative to remaining single, while "D
sets to zero the gains from marriage, relative to divorce .
3. The allocations implied by the Pareto weight µ equal those generated by the bargaining
solution: µ = B
 
WD
H ,WD
W
 
, where Wi represents the gain of spouse i from marriage, relative
to divorce.
4. The allocations generate, for each household type i, a level of taxable household income Y T
i
such that T0
i
 
Y T
i
 
= TM
i , and Ti
 
Y T
i
 
/Y T
i = TA
i .
133.6 Computation
The model’s solution is computed using a standard numerical strategy. With progressive taxation,
the tax rate depends on the labor income of the household, and hence on the leisure allocations.
The time-allocation problem is therefore solved by guessing the labor income (and hence the tax
rate), solving for the leisure allocation, and updating the guess until we have guessed the correct
labor income, given µ. Thus the static components of the model are easily solved.
The solution strategy for the dynamic equilibrium in the marriage market is to solve for the
Egalitarian value of µ, given guesses on
 
"M," D 
and associated approximations for the values V M
i
of being married, as functions of ".
Given these value-function approximations, we search over the unit simplex in R2 to ﬁnd a pair  
"M," D 
of stationary marriage and divorce rates. To compute the marriage/divorce thresholds,
we deﬁne the minimum weight µM
i (") as the Pareto weight that leaves a single agent of sex i
indiﬀerent between marriage and single life: Wi
⇣
µM
i ,"
⌘
=0 . Similarly we can deﬁne µD
i (") as the
value that leaves a married agent of sex i indiﬀerent between marriage and divorce. The surplus
equals the sum of the gains Wj (µj,"), so if we can compute µM
i (") then we can ﬁnd "M by solving
µM
W
 
"M 
+ µM
H
 
"M 
=1 . The divorce threshold "D is computed in a similar way. Of course if " is
iid then "D = "M   2dc.
At the threshold values
 
"M," D 
, the surplus is zero, so all Pareto-optimal bargaining solutions
imply the same value of µ. Taking the future as given, we can easily compute the Egalitarian
solution by equating the gains from marriage; this gives the threshold value of ":
"M =  WM
 
µE 
=  WW
 
µE 
The Pareto weight µ depends on the continuation values of married versus single, which in turn
depend on the marriage and divorce thresholds "M," D. The procedure is identical for the divorce
threshold. Indeed for the case of iid marriage quality, it is easy to see that "D = "M   2dC.
Once we know the thresholds, we can use the Bellman equations (3) to compute the bargaining
solution for any ✏ in
⇥
✏D,✏ M⇤
. The approximations to the value functions are then updated by
splining the value of marriage for each spouse on a grid over
⇥
✏D,✏ M⇤
.
This procedure converges monotonically in the Euclidean norm to a ﬁxed point for "M," D. At
the ﬁxed point, all of the equilibrium conditions hold, by construction.
As discussed earlier, the Nash equilibrium yields a Pareto weight that depends on the marriage
quality. If this is persistent then the average marriage quality, and hence the allocations, will be
functions of the marriage (and divorce) rates. Even with iid quality, the non-linearity of the decision
rules may cause the average of the decisions to diﬀer from the decisions of the average householders
of each type. With the solutions in hand, there are at least one potential reason why it may
be important to base statistics from the model on simulations. The statistics reported below are
therefore based on simulations of the model.
4 Calibration
The calibration is in two stages; ﬁrst we choose parameters for the time allocation problem to match
time-use statistics and the NIPA equipment share of consumption, then in the second stage for the
marriage-matching problem, we choose parameters to match marriage and the wife-husband leisure
ratio for the two years.
144.1 Reconciliation of time-use survey to CPS Hours
We ﬁrst deal with two problems in the time-use data: 1) discrepancies in paid hours with the March
CPS, 2) the presence of variation at business-cycle frequencies. We also break down unpaid work
into two categories: home production, and work-related time, which involves commuting and unpaid
time at work, such as meal-times.
The March CPS is the standard macro data series for hours worked, so the exercise is more
useful to macro-economists if it conforms to this series. Since business-cycle variation is outside the
scope of the paper, we reconcile paid work hours in the time-use data with the 1975 and 2003 values
from a 20 year moving average of paid hours from the March CPS. Table 4 shows how this is done.
For each sex-marital -status group, the table lists under ‘Time-Survey’ the values for weekly hours
of paid and unpaid work for the years 1975 and 2003. The next column, ’Adjusted to CPS’, lists the
paid weekly hours from the CPS. The other hours numbers in this column reﬂect the reallocation of
the deviation in paid hours to home work and non-working time. The adjustment to the time-use
data consists of setting paid time equal to the averaged CPS level for the year, and then increasing
the work-related time in proportion to the adjustment to paid work time. Home hours are then
reduced by the same factor, so as to minimize the impact of the adjustments on leisure hours.
It turns out that the paid-work variable in the time-use data is a better match to the smoothed
CPS time series than to the raw data. The time-use averages are shown along with the adjustments
in Table 4. The end result is that the larger changes are conﬁned to singles; reductions in paid work
for single men of a bout two hours in 1975 and three hours in 2003, and a two-hour increase for single
women in 1975. In terms of leisure, the only change exceeding one hour is a 2.45 hours increase for
single men in 2003, about 3%. For married couples there is one correction to paid work that exceeds
one hour, a reduction in husband’s paid hours from 38.87 to 36.62 for 2003. Qualitatively however
relative leisure remains essentially constant, the wife/husband ratio exhibiting a very small decline
from 1.05 to 1.047.
4.2 Income and Taxes
From the March CPS, we have labor income and total personal income for the whole sample in every
year. The wage is computed as the ratio of labor income to hours worked and averaged each year
over the population aged 18-65 of each sex. This results in the estimates reported in Table A4 in the
appendix and imply a growth of real wages of 19% over the period. Non-wage compensation, which
is excluded from the CPS measure, also grew rapidly over the period. According to Meisenheimer
(May 2005), analysis of the National Compensation Survey reveals that total compensation per hour
in the nonfarm business sector actually grew 32% between 1979 and 2003, the excess over reported
wage growth being due to a 55% growth in beneﬁts.
We take non-labor income to be the excess of total personal income over reported labor income.
The mean estimates, reported in Table A4 in the appendix, in terms of ratios to mean full labor
income,i.e. the sum of the observed wages, are on the order of 4% for married and 6% for singles. In
aggregate, macro economists usually ﬁnd non-labor income to be about a third of GDP. Supposing
our population to be representative of the economy as a whole this would lead us to expect non-
labor income to average about 10% of full income, so the CPS measurements appear to be quite
low. This may be explained by mis-measurement (eg omission of non-realized capital income) or
by exclusion from the sample of the retired population, which is likely to have a particularly high
share of non-labor income.
The tax function is taken from Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012). This is a three-parameter
15function:
T (y)=( ↵0 + ↵1 ln(y/¯ y))
, where the average tax rate for the household with average income ¯ y equals ↵0 and the marginal
tax rate ↵0 + ↵1. The function is ﬁtted for the years 1970 and 2000 to IRS data on average
tax rates by income of the household and ﬁling type (married or single).7 For married couples
in 1970 the coeﬃcients are (0.096,0.0814) and in 2000 (0.1023,0.0733), while for singles they are
(0.1597,0.0857) in 1970 and (0.1547,0.0497) in 2000. The tax functions are normalized by average
household income in each year. Note that the marginal tax rate for the married household with
average income is roughly 0.18 in both 1970 and 2000, reﬂecting the fact that the decline of marginal
tax rates so often discussed in the literature on female labor supply was a short-run phenomenon,
at least in regards to married couples. Marginal tax rates for singles did decline, from 0.25 to 0.2
at the average income. The tax functions are shown in Figure 3(b).
4.3 Technology Parameters
We use equation (1) to set the substitutability parameter ⌘1 for married-couples’ home labor to
match the change in the home-production time ratio:
⌘1 =
log
⇣
wM
wW
⌘
2003
  log
⇣
wM
wW
⌘
1975
log
⇣
hW
hM
⌘
2003
  log
⇣
hW
hM
⌘
1975
This yields a value of ⌘1 =0 .33, which implies a high elasticity of substitution between the labor of
husband and wife. An interesting implication of this value is that the fact that wives spend much
more time than husbands in home production is entirely explained by the wage diﬀerential; the
productivity parameter value ⌘0 =0 .475, which implies roughly equal productivity of spouses at
home, is required in order to generate the observed home-labor ratios. Of course if the model were
to be expanded to allow for other factors that might have cause the home hours ratio to fall over
time, then the elasticity estimate would be considerably reduced.
An important advantage of the Cobb-Douglas production function relative to a more general
speciﬁcation is that it provides a clean way to calibrate the role of equipment, as represented
by the parameter ✓. From the NIPA we have observations on a related quantity, the share of
home equipment in total NIPA consumption expenditure. The NIPA series for equipment and
furniture spending, as shown in Figure 4(a), appears to ﬂuctuate between 4 and 6 per cent of total
consumption. Part (b) of the diagram, shows that the price index for equipment has been falling
rapidly relative to the CPI. 8
Since total spending on NIPA consumption goods equals net income in our model, lets call this
Y N , which equals observed income net of taxes. Let total spending on the home good be SG ,a n d
spending on home equipment be SE. We now set the parameter ✓ so that the model will match
the observation on SE/Y N ⌘ XEY . Similarly, let the equipment share of production spending be
SE
SG ⌘ XEG
7I am grateful to Remzi Kayusz for supplying the 1970 coeﬃcients. The historical data is available for 1916-1999
at the IRS web Statistics on Income web site:
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0„id=223808,00.html
8Note in the ﬁgure that the relative prices of goods that might be part of a broader deﬁnition of home equipment,
such as cars, services or even housing, have been quite stable when compared to the price of home equipment, which
justiﬁes calibrating to spending on the narrow NIPA deﬁnition.
16We can infer XEG from XEY :
XEY =
SE
Y N =
SE
SG
SG
Y N = XEGXGN
so we can replicate the observed XEG by setting
✓ =
 
1   XEG 
ˆ ⌧
(1   XEG)ˆ ⌧ + XEG
, where ˆ ⌧ is the eﬀective progressivity of the tax schedule for married couples, as deﬁned in the
appendix. A similar procedure is applied to singles.
We assume work costs are proportional to time spent working, and for each year set ⌧ to match
the ratio of unpaid work-related time to paid work time, averaged over all household types.
4.4 Preference Parameters
We set the utility curvature parameter  1 to 1.5, the same value taken by Attanasio, Low, and
Sanchez-Marcos (2008) to represent a happy medium of existing practices. With the technology
parameters in place we can infer the amount of consumption of the home good from the data
on home hours, as well as the eﬀective prices of the home good. For each household type we
set the parameters  C,  l,  g so that the model exactly matches the average hours spent on home
production, leisure and paid work. For singles, we can express expenditure on each good as a share
of consumption expenditure:
XHC =
wAh + peeq
c
=
✓
 g
D c
◆1/ 1 wA + pexe
xg
, where the proportions xe = eq/hM and xg = hM/g are derived in the Appendix.
Assuming we can observe XHC, then we can infer the ratio of preference weights as:
 g
 c
=
✓
XHC xg
wA + pexe
◆ 1
DM
Of course we can do the same for the leisure-expenditure ratio XLC,
XLC =
wAl
c
=
wA    l
wM
 1/ 1
( c)
1/ 1
from which we infer the ratio:
 l
 c
=
✓
XLC
wA
◆ 1
wM
.
Imposing that the weights sum to 1 then results in values for each utility-weight parameter.
4.5 Results: Parameter Values
The statistical targets that were used to choose the parameter values are shown in Table 5(a) . In
addition to the 26 targets shown there, the work-related time from Table 4 was used to set the values
of the work costs, for a total of 28 targets. However the procedure described above uses the leisure
expenditure shares, not the actual leisure times; leisure times of married couples are therefore not
pinned down, leaving 26 targets.
17The resulting parameter values are shown in Table 6(a). It is clear that the calibration implies
a limited role for equipment: the home-output elasticity with respect to labor input is around 90%
for all household types, leaving only 10% for equipment. This means that doubling the amount of
home equipment purchased would increase home output by only 7%. Even for single men in the
1970s, who appear to be more reliant on equipment, with an 80% labor share, doubling equipment
would result in home output increasing by less than 15%. The reason ✓ turns out so low is that
the cost of the labor inputs is so high; for married couples, accounting for the cost of the husband’s
time signiﬁcantly reduces the apparent role of equipment.
In regards to preferences, we see another reason limiting the impact of home technology: the
utility weight on home goods is very small, in the 3-7% range. This implies relatively low expenditure
shares; wealth eﬀects will be largely absorbed by the other goods, such as leisure, with expenditure
shares on the order of 2/3. In Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) for example, technical
change increases married women’s paid labor by “liberating” women from home production; however
that paper abstracts from both husband’s time input and the leisure margin, implying larger eﬀects
on paid labor than would obtain in the current paper.
Another interesting implication of the time allocation data is that the utility weight on leisure
has decreased over time; this is implied by the observation that expenditure shares on leisure have
decreased since 1975. While all 3 types seem to care less now about leisure, the decline is by far
the greatest for married couples; this comes from the fall in the leisure share of spending over time.
The leisure decline observed here is of course consistent with leisure having increased over the much
longer run, documented in Aguiar and Hurst (2007), who analyze per capita trends since 1965,
and Greenwood and Vandenbroucke (2005), who argue leisure declining since the 19th century.
Per-capita leisure also increases here because the composition of the population has shifted from
low-leisure types (married households) to high-leisure types (singles).
Finally, the model implies that the decline of marriage is unrelated to wages or income; the sum
of the utility of a single man and a single woman increases by 0.27, about 4%, from 1975 to 2003,
so that singles are indeed better oﬀ , but that of married couples increases by 0.36 (about 5%), so
marriage rates would have increased slightly if left to these inﬂuences alone.
4.6 Bargaining and the marriage equilibrium
In this section we calibrate the model so that it yields the correct values for the marriage rates,
the divorce rate and the Pareto weights µ for two calibration years: 1975 and 2003. The stochastic
process for ✏ is arbitrarily ﬁxed to an iid standard normal with mean zero and variance   =2 .
We impose that µ is the weighted sum of two bargaining solutions. Let ! be the weight on the
Egalitarian bargaining solution and (1   !) the weight on the Nash solution.9
Three parameter values are held constant over the two calibration dates: the relative joy of
being single qW/qM, the divorce cost dC, and the weight ! on the Egalitarian bargaining solution.
The level, as represented by qW is allowed to vary to help match the change in marriage rates over
time. This means here are ﬁve free parameter values to set.
For any given year, the aggregate output of the marriage-market model consists of marriage rate
⇡M , divorce rate ⇡D, and the relative leisure lW/lH. Because oﬃcial estimates of the empirical
marriage and divorce hazard rates not available after 1995, these are computed instead from the
annual transitions in the distribution marital status in the March CPS according to a simple pro-
cedure described in the appendix, starting from the fraction of women already married by age 18.
This ensures that the hazard rates are consistent with the population fractions.
9Recall that this is to get the required elasticity of relative leisure, holding constant the relative joy of single life
qW/qM.A na l t e r n a t i v es t r a t e g yw o u l db et og ow i t ho n eb a r g a i n i n gs o l u t i o na n db a c ko u tt h ev a r i a t i o ni nqW/qM.
18There are therefore 6 potential targets. Since there are only 5 parameters in the loop, we drop
one of the targets, the divorce rate for 2003. Matching this would require higher persistence in ✏
to allow divorce rates to fall when marriage rates rise. Since persistence makes the model more
diﬃcult to compute, it is natural to begin by abstracting from this feature. The initial conditions
for the simulation consists of the fraction of women married by age 18 and a vector of marriage
quality, assumed to be above the threshold, for these women. In practice, the mass of these women
is so small that they make little diﬀerence for the quantitative results.
The targets for this calibration are shown in Table 5(b) and the resulting parameters in Table
6(b). They imply that women get more direct utility from single life than men do; qW/qM =1 .25;
this is needed to explain why wives get roughly the same leisure as husbands despite having higher
pecuniary gains from marriage due to having lower wages. The estimates also imply that single life
was a better deal in 1975 than in 2003; as the ﬁrst stage of the calibration delivers an increase in
the economic gains from marriage, a decline in the joy of single life [qw,q M] is imposed to match the
decline of the marriage rate. The results is a marriage rate of 8.5% in 1975 for the benchmark model,
compared to a target of 9.3%, and 4.4% in 1975, compared to a target of 4.6%. The magnitude of
the decline is therefore very similar in the model (48%) and the data (51%).
The calibrated divorce cost is fairly high; 5.29 is equivalent to four years of full income for
married couples in 1975, 2.6 years in 2003. This is related to the dispersion in the marriage shock;
less dispersion would imply a lower divorce cost to match the data, since very bad shocks would
be less frequent. Higher persistence would also reduce calibrated divorce costs, as married quality
would be higher on average than under the unconditional process. This would also help deal with
the non-targeted divorce rate, which increases in the model, while it declines in the data, although
this could be easily be ﬁxed by indexing the divorce cost to income.
The model puts 40% weight on the Egalitarian and 60% on the Nash solution. This comes from
matching the elasticity of the wife/husband leisure ratio, given that we have imposed that there is no
shift in the relative utility from single life. The role of the Nash solution is to reduce the elasticity of
µ wrt relative wages. It also turns out that under the Nash solution the Pareto weight is a declining
function of ✏, because men’s gains increase with ✏ relative to women’s gains from marriage; for low
✏ the main component of gains is the pecuniary gain, which is larger for women, while for large
values the main component is marriage quality, which is assumed to be equal. Therefore there is a
potential for changes in the marriage rates to aﬀect allocations through µ.
5 Experiments
The goal of the experiments is to measure the relative importance for marriage and paid labor hours
of the historically-changing variables that we take as exogenous, such as wages, the equipment price
and the eﬀective tax rate of working wives. The idea is that for each experiment, all parameters are
ﬁxed at the values for the 1975 benchmark, except for the parameter that the particular experiment
is concerned with, which is set to its value in the 2003 benchmark. The main results are reported
in Table 7, which explicitly explores the role of bargaining in generating responses to changes in
relative wages and to changes in preferences, which turn out to be the two main forces at work in
the model. Columns (1) and (7) show the benchmark outcomes for 2003 and 1975, respectively; the
other columns correspond to experiments. Those experiments where bargaining does not play an
important role are shown in Table 8.
Column (6) in Table 7 shows that without bargaining, the eﬀect of wage convergence is to drive
down the wife/husband leisure ratio from 1.05 in 1975 to 0.93 in 2005. In Column (3) however,
we see that the response of the Pareto weight through bargaining brings the ratio back up to 1.02,
19and Column (2) shows that shifting preferences return it the rest of the way to the old ratio, while
Column (5) shows the eﬀect of preference shifting is entirely through the implications for bargaining.
In other words, the preference shifts aﬀect relative leisure only through improving the position of
single women relative to single men. Bargaining is therefore playing the critical role in maintaining
the leisure ratio, allowing the improved position of single women to oﬀset the direct impact of
relative wages on the married allocation.
Column (3) shows that the rise in wife’s working hours was due entirely to the rise in relative
wages; this can account, on its own, for all of the 8 hour increase. In fact, Column (6) shows that the
impact of relative wages is considerably higher in the absence of bargaining; the wife’s labor supply
would have risen by an additional 3.5 hours, an error equal to about 44% of the observed increase.
A similar result applies to the change in preferences, which would have generated an additional 1.7
hours with rigid Pareto weights, an eﬀect that is entirely oﬀset by the impact, via bargaining, of
the implied welfare gain of single women relative to single men.
The stability of men’s hours on the other hand appears to be due to the conﬂicting eﬀects of
preferences and relative wages. First Column (6) in Table 7 shows that, with rigid Pareto weights,
the rise in the wife’s relative wages would have driven husband’s working hours down from 37.63
to 30.61, very much as we predicted from the back-of-the envelope computation in the theoretical
section. Allowing for bargaining, Column (3) shows that the eﬀect of the relative wage is much less
severe, and results in the husband’s working 32.70 hours weekly. The static part of the calibration
told us that in the preferences of married couples consumption had gained in importance at the
expense of leisure. Column (2) shows that on its own this would have increased husband’s working
hours by more than 4 hours, to 42.32. However Table 8 shows that this eﬀect is largely oﬀset in
turn by wage and income growth, which on its own results in a 3-hour decline. Finally, recall that
preferences shifting on its own would also have increased with wife-husband leisure ratio; this eﬀect,
due to single women being made better oﬀ relative to single men, would have added 1.1 hours to
men’s work hours. Bargaining is therefore an important component of the story, raising husband’s
labor supply by about 3.2 hours relative to the unitary model, but there are also large eﬀects that
do not operate through bargaining.
We saw that husband’s home-work hours rose by 5.87 hours over the period; Column (3) in
Table 7 indicates that 3 hours can be attributed to the shift in the relative wage, and Column (2)
that two hours were due to the preference shift away from leisure. Columns(5) and (6) show that
these eﬀects are independent of bargaining, which is to be expected, as the theoretical model showed
that the home production decisions are independent of the Pareto weights.
For wives’ home hours, the big picture is a 5.1 hour decline; Column (3) shows that on its own,
the declining gender wage gap would have caused a much larger decline, more than 10 hours, but
this is oﬀset in part by the eﬀects of the preference shift (+6 hours), shown in Column (2), and a
smaller eﬀect (1.8 hours) of income and wage growth, as shown in Table 8.
Table 8 shows that there are some eﬀects of equipment price on home-work hours of married
women (about 1.3 hours) and men (about half an hour). This translates into a gain in wive’s paid
work of about a half hour; as one might have guessed from the preference estimates, most of the
impact is soaked up by a increase in the wife’s leisure time.
Marriage rates decline by about 50% in the benchmark models, but the only force inside the
model that contributes to this is the decline of equipment price; Table 8 shows that on its own this
drives the marriage rate down to 7.8% annually; hence this accounts for 17% of the decline.10 The
residual decline is attributed by the calibration to the decline in the joy of single life, as explained
10The size of this eﬀect could be increased by imposing a ﬁxed cost of household formation, as in Greenwood and
Guner (2009).
20in Section 4 above. In Table 8, we see that changes in marriage rates, driven by a rise in the level
of q, hurt women more than men, as the relative leisure of wives declines to 1.04 from the 1975
benchmark of 1.06. This eﬀect is small however so marriage rates do not appear to have a strong
impact on allocations within married couples.
In summary, the experiments showed that bargaining is playing a quantitatively ﬁrst-order role
in the analysis of relative leisure and paid labor supply. The main message regarding marriage
decline is that wage changes appear to have little to with it, at least not through the channels
available in the current model, but that declining equipment prices may play an important role.
5.1 Annual Trends
So far the analysis has been conﬁned to a comparison of two years, 1975 and 2003. Now suppose
instead we consider year-by-year comparisons of the model with the data over this period. The
method is to compute the decision rules for each year using the same routine that was used for
calibration, but to allow parameters that correspond to observables, such as wage and income
parameters, to vary so as to match the observations for the year in question, while those that
cannot be derived from observables each year, such as home technology or utility parameters, are
set as weighted averages of the benchmark values from 1975 and 2003. This ensures that the model
matches the data for 1975 and 2003; the question is how well it does in the intervening years. The
annual data, as in the calibration, consists of 20-year moving averages from the March CPS. This
exercise is not entirely coherent; we are assuming each year that the bargaining outcome of the
newly married is computed as if the current conditions were to persist forever, even though we
allow unforeseen changes each year; hence the importance of using moving averages to smooth out
the transitory variations.
The role of bargaining can be seen by comparing the results from an alternative trend compu-
tation, using the same parameters but with the Pareto weights ﬁxed at the 1975 values.
The results of this procedure are shown in Figure 5. In panel (a) we see that for married-women’s
labor supply, the model line stays in contact with the data line except for the period 1976-1984,
where it lies slightly below, by about one hour. The line corresponding to the ﬁxed Pareto weight
on the other hand parts company with the data line about 1983; the prediction error is already
two hours by 1985, and continues to grow to 2003. For men’s labor supply, on the other hand, the
model with the ﬁxed Pareto weight does better the benchmark for the ﬁrst 10 years, staying closer
to the data line, which falls by slightly more than an hour over this period. Over the 1985-2003
period however, the data remains stationary at just under 37 hours weekly, while the Fixed-weight
line continues its steady decline down to 34 weekly hours. The benchmark line ﬂuctuates around
the data line, the gap peaking at roughly one hour above in 1983, and a half-hour below in 1997.
Overall then we can say that the ﬁxed-weight model does slightly better than the benchmark model
over the 1975-85 period, but signiﬁcantly worse after that.
Given that ﬂexible Pareto weights play such an important role in matching labor supply over
time, a useful next step for future research would be to compare the predictions of diﬀerent types of
bargaining models against the data. One basic question would be the role of commitment; can we
assume that Pareto weights are ﬁxed for the duration of the marriage, or do we need to allow the
weights to vary within the marriage as well? Consider a simulation in which the trend is computed
for a population in which the weights are ﬁxed for each marriage cohort but allowed to vary between
cohorts. In each new marriage, the allocation corresponds to the bargaining outcome from the trend
computation described earlier. The marriages from each year are carried over the following year,
subject to the observed divorce rates, and new marriages formed at the observed marriage rates, as
summarized in Figure 3.
21In Figure 6 we show the results of this simulation with cohort-speciﬁc weights, and compare
them to the Benchmark trend results. Not surprisingly given the low rates of marriage and divorce
in the data, the cohort-speciﬁc line resembles that for ﬁxed Pareto weights; married-men’s paid labor
lies everywhere below that in the benchmark model, and married-women’s lies everywhere above.
The eﬀect of allowing variation between marriage cohorts shows up as a signiﬁcant reduction of the
prediction error; by the year 2000 for instance, the two-hour error for wive’s paid labor in the ﬁxed
weight case in Figure 5(a) has been reduced to one hour. A similar pattern holds for married-men’s
paid labor. The exercise suggests therefore that a model of full commitment can account for about
half of the deviation between the data and the ﬁxed-weight model.
6 Discussion
The emphasis on bargaining in this paper should not be taken too literally; it is intended as a short-
hand for any mapping from outside options to the division of surplus, as in the micro-empirical
literature on “collective” models of the household. The household model proposed here relies on
a bargaining solution with divorce threat-points, but the same argument could apply to other
models of intra-household allocation, provided that the the division of surplus is allowed to depend
monotonically on some measure of the relative value of disagreement that is increasing in own wages.
Whether the actual determination occurs through bargaining, auctions, judicial decisions or shifting
social norms would seem to be without consequence for the basic argument.
It should also be noted that there are two strong empirical justiﬁcations for divorce threat-points.
First, data about the lives of singles, such as labor supply, wages and marriage rates, can be used, in
combination with a suitable model of single life, to estimate the threat-points. In this paper, these
threat-points are determined in the marriage-market equilibrium, as remarriage plays an important
role in the value of being single. Second, the estimation results of Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix
(2002) at the micro level imply that household labor supply is better described by a bargaining
model with divorce threat-points than one with non-cooperative marriage as a threat-point.
The model is simple enough that it is easily extended to accommodate concerns outside the
scope of the current paper. According to Ventura and Bachrach (2000), the fraction of child births
accounted for by unmarried women has increased from 10 per cent in 1970 to nearly 35 per cent
today. This suggests a big part of the marriage trend may be due to child costs falling for single
women relative to married women. This trend may be due to pecuniary factors, such as welfare
transfers to single mothers, or to non-pecuniary, such as a decline in the stigma associated with
single motherhood. These ideas are pursued in a related paper in progress, Kennes and Knowles
(2011), which argues the advent of more eﬃcient birth control can explain the rise in single women’s
fertility and the decline of marriage rates.
Because the current model is so abstract, the estimated eﬀects presented above should be seen
as provisional. Even a simple change like adding ﬁxed costs of household formation could increase
the importance of wage changes for explaining the decline of marriage. It would be interesting to
see whether the addition of dynamics in the form of fertility, savings or human-capital investments
aﬀect the interpretations presented here, but while it is clear that some of the results will change, the
size of the bargaining eﬀects suggests that bargaining will remain an important part of explaining
time-allocation shifts over the last 40 years.
The integration of marriage and home-production into a model of intra-household allocation was
essential for the insights presented here. However the main message regarding the decline of marriage
was that it appeared not be directly driven by changes in wages or technology. Marriage rates in
the US declined at a time of unprecedented prosperity and while women’s wages were increasing
22relative to men’s. It is tempting therefore to link the increased attractiveness of single life implied
by these developments to the decline of marriage. The method of the current paper, by calibrating
to data on time-allocation of both married and single households, suggested that wage/technological
explanations had a relatively minor impact; in terms of the model, shifting preferences turned out
to play the leading role. These changes in preferences should be interpreted as proxies for inﬂuences
outside the model; the result therefore implies that more structure is required in the model to isolate
potential sources of the decline in marriage rates.
One might ask why married men’s working time declined in the period 1950-1975; the results
of the wage-growth experiment in Table 8 suggest that we can expect labor-supply decline to ac-
company economic growth, and that bargaining has little to say about this eﬀect. There are two
further reasons that distinguish the 1950s and 1960s from the period studied here: 1) the gender
wage gap was not declining, and 2) divorce was costly and rare, so the outside options were likely
to have been less relevant to married couples.
A more relevant concern might be the elasticity of substitution of the spouses time in the home
production function. Recall that this was calibrated by matching the decline in the wive’s home-
work relative to that of the husbands. A more sophisticated approach might consider the possibility
of technical change that made husband’s time more productive at home. An example of this early
in the 20th century would be the invention of substitutes for mother’s milk in nursing infants, as in
Albanesi and Olivetti (2006). The impact of other examples, such as the advent of home-laundry
machines, as in Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) are probably still too early to explain
the transition since the 1970s. Such forces, if found to be quantitatively signiﬁcant in the 1970s,
would reduce the calibrated wage-elasticity of labor supply, and thus weaken the impact of the
relative wage on the home allocations, but the importance of bargaining would remain, as this
inferred from the leisure ratios, independently of the home technology.
The model may also have interesting implications for tax reform. This did not have a major
impact in the experiments because there was not much change in the tax schedules, at least for
married couples, over the 1975-2003 period; the ﬂattening of the tax schedule discussed by Prescott
(2004) occurred in the 1980s, and appears to have vanished by the end of the 1990s. It remains to
be seen therefore how a change in the progressivity of taxes might aﬀect aggregate labor supply,
and hence tax revenues. Because single women are poorer than single men, a more progressive
tax system would shift bargaining power to wives, reducing their labor supply relative to that of
husbands. A deeper question that the model would be suitable for is to examine the impact of joint
versus individual taxation of married couples, in the spirit of Chade and Ventura (2005).
7 Conclusion
The central point that motivated this paper is that the absence of a strong relation between wages
and relative leisure of spouses is far from being an indicator that bargaining may be safely ignored; to
the contrary, in the context of Neoclassical models, this is a compelling indicator of the importance
of household bargaining.
Standard explanations of rising female labor supply have strong implications for husband’s time
allocations that have not been explored in the previous literature; the exception is Jones, Manuelli,
and McGrattan (2003), who predict that husband’s labor time should decline signiﬁcantly. Time-
use data in the US suggest that this did not happen over the 1975-2003 period when the gender
gap in wages was closing. This paper showed that allowing for bargaining between spouses is a
simple way to reconcile the trends in time allocation with the usual driving forces proposed in the
literature. The size of the eﬀects measured in the current paper suggests that it would be useful
23for macroeconomics to examine more closely the mechanism by which such inter-spousal allocations
actually occur.
Are macro-economists mistaken in ignoring bargaining between spouses? The results indicate
that the modeling of bargaining should not be a priority for all macroeconomic questions. Bargaining
in the model has little to add to the analysis of events whose impacts on the value of single life are
similar for both sexes. Even for events like shifts in relative wages, which do have strong implications
for bargaining, the eﬀects on husbands are nearly oﬀset by those on wives, so that bargaining could
be ignored in the analysis of per-capita labor supply, at least as a ﬁrst pass.
Where bargaining appears essential is in the analysis of the response of sex-speciﬁc behavior,
such as married-men’s labor supply, to changes that aﬀect the relative value of single life. We saw
that the errors from the “unitary” version of the model were large relative to those of the bargaining
model. The implications for future research are not limited to the shocks analyzed here. The impact
of improved birth control, the decline of stigmatization of divorce, or the advent of aﬃrmative action
in employment are also likely to have raised the value of single life more for women than for men. In
the light of the current results, it would be rash to interpret the impact of such changes on married-
women’s labor supply or on marriage rates without considering the implications for bargaining;
small or insigniﬁcant labor-supply eﬀects for instance may mask large welfare eﬀects for married
women.
24References
Aguiar, M., and E. Hurst (2007): “Measuring Trends in Leisure: The Allocation of Time over
Five Decades,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1 2 2 ( 3 ) ,9 6 9 – 1 0 0 6 .
Albanesi, S., and C. Olivetti (2006): “Gender roles and technological progress,” 2006 Meeting
Papers 411, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Attanasio, O., H. Low, and V. Sanchez-Marcos (2008): “Explaining Changes in Female
Labour Supply in a Life-cycle Model,” American Economic Review,9 8 ( 4 ) ,1 5 1 7 – 5 2 .
Bech-Moen, O. C. (2006): “Gender Diﬀerences in Market and Home Hours,” Mimeo, University
of Oslo.
Becker, G. S. (1988): “Family Economics and Macro Behavior,” American Economic Review,
78(1), 1–13.
Biddle, J. E., and D. S. Hamermesh (1990): “Sleep and the Allocation of Time,” Journal of
Political Economy,9 8 ( 5 ) ,9 2 2 – 4 3 .
Blau, F. D., and L. M. Kahn (1997): “Swimming Upstream: Trends in the Gender Wage
Diﬀerential in 1980s,” Journal of Labor Economics,1 5 ( 1 ) ,1 – 4 2 .
Browning, M., and M. Gortz (2006): “Spending time and money within the household,” Dis-
cussion paper, Oxford Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series.
Burda, M., D. S. Hamermesh, and P. Weil (2007): “Total Work, Gender and Social Norms,”
IZA Discussion Papers 2705, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Burdett, K., and M. G. Coles (1999): “Long-Term Partnership Formation: Marriage and
Employment,” Economic Journal,1 0 9 ( 4 5 6 ) ,F 3 0 7 – 3 4 .
Chade, H., and G. Ventura (2005): “Income Taxation and Marital Decisions,” Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics,8 ( 3 ) ,5 6 5 – 5 9 9 .
Chiappori, P.-A., B. Fortin, and G. Lacroix (2002): “Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation
and Household Labor Supply,” Journal of Political Economy,1 1 0 ( 1 ) ,3 7 – 7 2 .
Choo, E., S. Seitz, and A. Siow (2008): “Marriage matching, risk sharing and spousal labor
supplies,” Working Papers tecipa-332, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
Gershuny, J., and J. P. Robinson (1988): “Historical Changes in the Household Division of
Labor,” Demography,2 5 ( 4 ) ,5 3 7 – 5 5 2 .
Greenwood, J., and N. Guner (2009): “Marriage and Divorce since World War II: Analyzing
the Role of Technological Progress on the Formation of Households,” in NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 2008, Volume 23, NBER Chapters, pp. 231–276. National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Greenwood, J., N. Guner, and J. A. Knowles (2000): “Women on Welfare: A Macroeconomic
Analysis,” American Economic Review,9 0 ( 2 ) ,3 8 3 – 3 8 8 .
(2003): “More on Marriage, Fertility, and the Distribution of Income,” International Eco-
nomic Review,4 4 ( 3 ) ,8 2 7 – 8 6 2 .
25Greenwood, J., A. Seshadri, and M. Yorukoglu (2005): “Engines of Liberation,” Review of
Economic Studies,7 2 ( 1 ) ,1 0 9 – 1 3 3 .
Greenwood, J., and G. Vandenbroucke (2005): “Hours Worked: Long-run Trends,” Economie
D’avant Garde, Research Report No. 10. University of Rochester.
Guner, N., R. Kaygusuz, and G. Ventura (2012): “Taxation, and Household Labor Supply,”
Review of Economic Studies,1 ,1 – 4 5 .
Jones, L. E., R. E. Manuelli, and E. R. McGrattan (2003): “Why are married women
working so much?,” Staﬀ Report 317, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Kalai, E. (1977): “Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Compar-
isons,” Econometrica,4 5 ( 7 ) ,1 6 2 3 – 3 0 .
Kaygusuz, R. (2010): “Taxes and Female Labor Supply,” Review of Economic Dynamics,1 3 ( 4 ) ,
725–741.
Kennes, J., and J. Knowles (2011): “Sex and Marital Prospects: An Equilibrium Analysis,”
Discussion paper, University of Southampton Working Paper.
Lise, J., and S. Seitz (2011): “Consumption Inequality and Intra-Household Allocations,” Review
of Economic Studies,7 8 ,3 2 8 – 3 5 5 .
Mazzocco, M. (2007): “Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and a
Test of Commitment,” Review of Economic Studies,7 4 ( 3 ) ,8 5 7 – 8 9 5 .
McElroy, M. B., and M. J. Horney (1981): “Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a
Generalization of the Theory of Demand,” International Economic Review,2 2 ( 2 ) ,3 3 3 – 4 9 .
Meisenheimer, J. R. (May 2005): “Real compensation, 1979 to 2003: analysis from several data
sources,” Monthly Labor Review,p p .3 – 2 2 .
Prescott, E. C. (2004): “Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans?,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review,2 8 ,2 – 1 3 .
Robinson, J. P., and G. Godbey (1997): Time for Life. The Pennsylvania State University
Press, University Park, PA.
Ventura, S. J., and C. A. Bachrach (2000): “Nonmarital Childbearing In The United
States,1940-99,” National Vital Statistics Reports,4 8 ( 1 6 ) .
26Single 24.22
Married 11.79
Single 25.71
Married 39.44
Single 22.54
Married 13.76
Single 24.52
Married 38.60
Single 23.07
Married 16.73
Single 25.13
Married 35.74
Single 24.89
Married 21.36
Single 27.20
Married 36.20
Single 25.95
Married 23.47
Single 28.22
Married 37.30
Single 24.67
Married 22.97
Single 26.52
Married 36.01
Table 1: Trends in Paid Hours Per Capita, March CPS ages 18-65
2002-2006
Women 
27.84
Men
1986-96
Women 
27.69
Men
1997-2001
Women 
29.01
Men
1967-75
Women 
25.37
Men
1976-85
Women 
25.45
Men
Years Sample
Weekly 
Hours
Per-Capita 
Hours
1962-66
Women 
25.24
MenWives Husbands Wives Husbands Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
Discretionary Time 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
Paid Work 11.54 42.07 14.8 38.17 17.6 35.51 21.82 38.2
Unpaid Work 45.28 19.4 36.79 17.91 35.6 21.32 32.32 20.29
Total Working Time 56.82 61.47 51.59 56.08 53.2 56.83 54.14 58.49
Non-Working Time  61.18 56.53 66.41 61.92 64.8 61.17 63.86 59.51
Sample Size 739 696 697 655 1122 966 4116 3774
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
2.71 6.54 2.02 4.06
21.31 1.98 14.86 3.33
6.18 3.8 6.55 4.24
2.36 4.53 4.06 7.01
4.23 1.06 4.83 1.65
Total Unpaid Work 36.79 17.91 32.32 20.29
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
34.5 33.07 32.43 35.51
Net Personal Care 25.4 23.31 24.44 20.12
6.51 5.54 6.99 3.88
66.41 61.92 63.86 59.51
1975 1985
Cooking and Indoor 
Chores
Other Home Production
"Leisure 1"
Variables
Table 2(a).  Time allocation of married couples. Author's computations from married people aged 18-65 in time-use surveys. Observations with more 
than 4 weekly hours unaccounted for  excluded.
2003 1965
Variables
Commute+Job-Related
2003
Table 2(c ) Composition of Non-Working Time. Author's computations from married 
people aged 18-65 in time-use surveys. "Leisure 1" refers to variable defined in  Aguiar & 
Hurst (2006).
Other Non-Working 
Time
Total Non-Working 
Time 
Table 2(b) Composition of Unpaid Work . Author's computations from married people aged 
18-65 in time-use surveys. 
1975
2003
Variables
Shopping
Child Care
197562-66 67-74 75-84 85-94 95-00 2000-06
18-24 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.92 0.91 0.90
25-54 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.74 0.76 0.75
55-56 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.64 0.63 0.66
Education
< HS 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.71 0.74 0.75
HS 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.73 0.76 0.76
College 0.58 0.60 0.66 0.75 0.76 0.75
BA 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.73 0.72 0.69
1965 1975 1985 2003
Less than 12 1.08 1.02 1.08 1.01
12 Years 1.06 1.14 1.03 1.06
13-15 years 1.20 0.98 1.03 1.08
16 or more 1.01 1.07 1.11 1.10
0.89 0.97 1.01 1.04
25-55 0.83 0.94 1.03 1.04
55-70 1.12 1.01 0.95 1.06
Age
Table 3(b): Non-Working Time of Married People. Author's Computations from the time-use 
surveys.
Subsample
Wife-Husband Ratios of Non-Working Time
Years of 
Education
Working
Table 3(a): Female-Male Wage Ratios by Age and Education. Author's computations from the CPS population of 
people aged 18-65 who worked at least 10 hours weekly on average.
Years
AgeTime-
Survey
Adjusted to 
CPS
Time-
Survey
Adjusted to 
CPS
Time-
Survey
Adjusted to 
CPS
Time-
Survey
Adjusted to 
CPS
Paid Work 19.24 21.26 27.47 25.55 15.51 15.08 38.73 38.01
Job-Related 3.72 4.11 4.86 4.52 2.72 2.64 6.48 6.36
Home Production 24.27 21.72 9.82 10.51 34.27 35.25 11.49 11.70
Total Work 47.23 47.09 42.15 40.58 52.50 52.97 56.70 56.07
Non-Working Hours 70.77 70.91 75.85 77.42 65.51 65.03 61.3 61.93
Total 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
Time-Survey Freq.
CPS Population Share
Paid Work 24.83 24.09 30.28 26.90 22.54 23.05 38.87 36.62
Job-Related 2.64 2.56 3.68 3.27 2.08 2.13 4.1 3.86
Home Production 20.53 21.14 11.88 13.21 30.74 30.04 16.59 17.55
Total Work 48.00 47.79 45.84 43.38 55.36 55.22 59.56 58.03
Non-Working Hours 70.01 70.21 72.17 74.62 62.65 62.78 58.43 59.97
Total 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
Time-Survey Freq.
CPS Population Share
Table 4: Reconciliation of  Working Hours from Time-Use Surveys to CPS Paid Work Time. Averages weighted by CPS population distribution. Adjustment 
includes reallocating paid work hours to, or from, unpaid work and non-work to match CPS paid hours.
12.12 13.87 37.78 36.23
2003
3912 3347
19.55
2405
29.17 20.94 30.34
Weekly Hours
Singles
Women Men
4238
1975
Married
250 149 719 671
Women MenData Model Data Model
Wives HP   home time 35.23 35.15 30.03 29.99
Husbands home time 11.7 11.68 17.55 17.53
single womens home time 21.72 21.77 21.14 21.14
single mens home time 10.5 10.5 13.21 13.25
equipment share 0.056 0.056 0.046 0.046
Wives  leisure 65.05 64.91 62.78 62.7
Husbands leisure 61.93 61.79 59.97 59.89
single womens leisure 70.91 71.08 70.21 70.2
single mens leisure 77.42 77.4 74.63 74.87
Wives paid work 15.08 15.23 23.06 22.88
Husbands paid work 38.01 37.8 36.62 36.68
single womens paid work 21.26 21.34 24.09 24.09
single mens paid work 25.55 25.55 26.9 27.01
Data Model Data Model
Marriage Rate 0.0929 0.0854 0.0458 0.0442
Divorce Rate 0.0249 0.0241 0.0178 0.0352
Wife/Husband Leisure Ratio 1.0505 1.0553 1.0469 1.0423
Table 5(b) Marriage-market calibration results. 
1975 2003
1975 2003
Statistic
Statistic
Table 5 (a) Time-allocation resultsConsumption Home Good Leisure
1975 0.898 0.260 0.051 0.689
2003 0.919 0.323 0.070 0.607
1975 0.817 0.224 0.026 0.750
2003 0.879 0.254 0.038 0.709
1975 0.906 0.193 0.072 0.735
2003 0.928 0.213 0.072 0.715
1975 0.178
2003 0.106
Value
1.25
0.83
0.71
5.29
0.38
Table 6(b) Values of marital matching parameters
Type
Table 6(a) Values of Time-Allocation parameters
Substitutability of Home 
Labor
0.475
Utility Weights
Theta Year
Married
Single Men
Single Women
Weight on Egalitarian Solution
Work Costs
Parameter
 Joy of single life: women/men
Men's joy of single life 1975
Men's joy of single life 2003
Divorce CostPreferences
Relative 
Wage
2003 Preferences
Relative 
Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.040 0.064 0.102 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.09
0.037 0.029 0.021 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
1.04 1.12 1.02 0.93 1.06 0.93 1.06
Wives 22.94 15.04 23.22 26.42 16.67 25.90 14.97
Husbands 36.52 43.40 32.70 33.82 42.32 30.61 37.63
Single women 24.09 23.13 21.29 24.09 23.13 21.29 21.34
Single men 27.01 27.67 25.26 27.01 27.67 25.26 25.55
Wives 30.02 41.05 24.72 30.02 41.05 24.72 35.15
Husbands 17.55 13.64 14.45 17.55 13.64 14.45 11.68
Single women 21.14 21.60 21.70 21.14 21.60 21.70 21.77
Single men 13.25 13.07 10.54 13.25 13.07 10.54 10.50
Wives 62.49 58.69 65.26 58.64 56.77 62.10 64.63
Husbands 59.93 52.49 64.30 62.92 53.76 66.75 61.24
Single women 70.20 69.14 71.22 70.20 69.14 71.22 71.08
Single men 74.87 72.33 77.69 74.87 72.33 77.69 77.40
Table 7: Main results with flexible and rigid Pareto weights. The case with rigid Pareto weight imposes the mapping from marriage 
quality to Pareto weight that is derived from the 1975 Benchmark calibration.
Statistic Bench2003
Flexible Pareto Weight Rigid Pareto Weight
Bench1975
Marriage rate
Divorce Rate
Wife/husband leisure ratio
Paid work
Home work
LeisureEquipment 
Price   
  Income 
and Wage 
Growth   
Tax 
Schedule   
Technology q level Work Costs
0.078 0.110 0.091 0.104 0.031 0.107
0.025 0.020 0.023 0.025 0.049 0.025
1.056 1.039 1.055 1.064 1.045 1.061
Wives 15.58 11.62 15.02 14.71 15.28 15.43
Husbands 37.56 34.3 37.64 37.8 37.42 39.94
Single women 21.51 20.99 22.07 21.34 21.34 22.75
Single men 25.66 23.76 26.19 25.55 25.55 27.06
Wives 33.87 36.54 35.1 35.15 35.15 35.23
Husbands 11.25 12.14 11.66 11.68 11.68 11.7
Single women 21.04 21.72 21.55 21.77 21.77 21.74
Single men 9.763 10.59 10.38 10.5 10.5 10.49
Wives 65.18 67.19 64.62 64.93 64.26 65.12
Husbands 61.74 64.7 61.23 61.04 61.48 61.35
Single women 71.62 71.55 70.44 71.08 71.08 71.09
Single men 78.01 79.41 76.76 77.4 77.4 77.57
Table 8: Other results with flexible Pareto weights.  
Experiments
Home work
Leisure
Statistic
Marriage rate
Divorce Rate
Wife/husband leisure ratio
Paid work1964-66
1974-76
1984-86
Figure 3: Median wages in the March CPS, by sex
Figure 1(a): Ratio of Mean Wages of Women to those of Men. Author's computations from the March CPS for population 18-65  years 
old working 10 hours or more weekly at paid employment 
Figure 1(b): Per-capita hours in the March CPS. Based on author's computations from reported hours worked in previous week by 
persons aged 18-65. With fitted quartic trend line.
Table 3: Paid Hours of married people: CPS vs Time-
Use surveys for 1965, 1975, 1985 and 2003
Figure 1(c): Per-capita hours by sex and marital status. Based on author's computations from March CPS, persons aged 18-65
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Figure 2a: Weekly Paid Hours of Married Women by Birth Cohort in the March CPS
Figure 2b: Weekly Paid Hours of Married Men by Birth Cohort in the March CPS
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Figure 3(b): Marginal Tax Rates. Imputed from IRS Summary Data.
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